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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT MISSTATES THE NATURE OF THE CASE, 
Defendants claim that plaintiff is seeking a "declaratior 
of coverage." However, plaintiff is not merely seeking a declara-
tion of coverage, but rather a claim for bad faith on the part of 
the insurance company in denying coverage and all damages stemming 
from the denial of coverage. Defendants have attempted to couch 
this case in simple terms of a valid denial of coverage. However, 
the case has at its core elements of bad faith and intentional 
manipulations by the defendants in an attempt to hide essential 
facts and to deny plaintiff coverage. Throughout defendant's brief, 
defendant is elusive as- to the true nature of this case. This 
dilution technique used by the defendant will be explained in this 
reply brief. 
Defendant also claims in the statement of the case that 
plaintiff had failed to renew the policy. Plaintiff claims that 
Utah's renewal statute should apply. See Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-17 
(1953 as amended). However, this is not a simple case of failure to 
renew an insurance policy. The term renewal has specific legal 
significance. Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-14(2) defines renewal as "the 
issuance and delivery by an insurer of a policy replacing at the end 
1 
)f the policy period a policy previously issued and delivered by the 
same insurer . . . but any policy with a policy period or term of 
Less than 12 months shall for the purpose of this act be considered 
as if written for a policy period or a term of 12 months.11 (Em-
phasis added) . Therefore, a policy which has on its face a six 
nonth renewal is required by statute to be deemed a one year renewal 
policy. 
In determining what notice is required in the present 
case, one looks not to Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-17 which states the 
requirements for notice upon non-renewal of a policy, but rather to 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-16 which is the notice of cancellation of 
policy provision, applied when a policy is cancelled rather than not 
renewed. That section requires at least 10 days notice of cancel-
lation prior to the termination of a policy. In the present case, 
plaintiff has testified that he received no such notice of cancel-
lation. (R. 300, 313). Plaintiff's affidavit was not rebutted with 
any other affidavits from the insurance company. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31-41-19 provides that proof of mailing to the named insured is 
sufficient proof of notice. However, no proof of mailing has been 
provided by the insurance company in the present case. Defendant's 
have skirted this issue by claiming in their statement of facts that 
"defendant's mailed to plaintiff a 'Notice of Cancellation—Non-
payment of Premium' which stated that the policy would terminate on 
May 15, 1984, if payment was not received in full." (Appellee's 
Brief, p. 2). This does not say, however, that defendant's mailed 
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ras made to deny coverage. (R. 166-170). Defendant's have claimed 
:hat this information is privileged, and have refused to provide the 
.nformation. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted 
)rior to the court ruling on plaintiff's outstanding requests for 
jroduction of these documents. Therefore, it seems scandalous to 
illow defendant's to argue that plaintiff has not proved payment 
/hen defendants may in fact have in their possession evidence of 
payment. 
III. PIAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT RELIES UPON A CASE READILY 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT CASE. 
Defendant's explanation of Larsen v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 
1151 (Utah 1981) dampens and dilutes the facts in an attempt to 
strengthen the analogy. However, a more lucid explanation of the 
facts reveals a sharp contrast between Larsen and the present case. 
In Larsen, an employer provided insurance for his employees. There 
was absolutely no employee participation. Each employee was 
provided with a book detailing the specific requirements for 
coverage. The book provided that the employees be "working as full 
time employees, 40 hours per week." Id. at 1153. The facts state 
that plaintiff received and read the handbook at the outset of his 
employment. The employee, in contemplation of changing jobs, 
discussed his eligibility for continued coverage under the policy. 
The employee therefore was completely aware of the possibility that 
he would not be covered. Additionally, the employee could have 
discussed the matter with a personnel officer or other official of 
the company. Once the employee left his full time status within the 
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rovided coverage, but the insurance company denied coverage, 
Ithout notice, claiming that no payment was received. The only 
dmilarity between Larsen and the present case is that payments were 
tade over a period of time. However, the employee had no reasonable 
expectation of coverage since no premium payments were made on his 
>ehalf, and since he knew that if he was not a full time employee he 
zould not be covered. This knowledge prevented proof of reliance. 
Cn the present case, the plaintiff had made a payment which was to 
provide coverage and then received coverage for a period of months. 
ie relied to his detriment upon those payments by not safeguarding 
all receipts of having made the premium payments. Additionally, he 
las incurred medical expenses which he otherwise would not have been 
able to afford because the defendant lulled him into a sense of 
security by providing coverage. 
IV. THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER COVERAGE 
EXISTED. 
To clearly focus on plaintiff's reasonable expectation 
that coverage existed at the time of the accident, an examination of 
the specific schedule of payments on the policy is helpful. 
Defendant's contend that $40.12 would have been required to keep the 
policy in effect. This is based on a notice of cancellation which 
states a cancellation date of May 15, 1984. However, at the bottom 
right hand corner of the notice there is a space provided with a 
heading "Date Mailed11. (R. 130). There is no date above this 
heading. It is plaintiff's contention that this notice of cancella-
tion was not sent until well after May 15, 1984. Therefore, the 
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only document in plaintiff's possession was a bill for his regula 
monthly payment. That regular monthly payment was usually aroun 
$18.00. If the plaintiff had mailed $18.00 plaintiff would hav< 
paid for coverage at the time of the accident. 
The reason the $18.00 would have provided coverage durinc 
the time of the accident is best explained by examining the "Expla-
nation of Account" provided through discovery requests. Ir 
November, 1983, plaintiff made a double payment so as to be, ir 
effect, one month's payment in advance. In December, 1983, plain-
tiff failed to make a payment. However, in January, 1984, plaintiff 
again made a double payment. Therefore, as of January, 1984, 
plaintiff was still one month in advance on his payments. In 
February and March plaintiff made regular monthly payments. In 
April however, plaintiff did not make a payment. His payment that 
he had made in advance would have been applied for this month. 
Therefore, plaintiff, at the end of April was current in that he had 
coverage, but had used up his advance payment. In May, 1984, 
plaintiff made the payment required by his statement from the 
insurance company. That amount was roughly $18.00 and would have 
provided coverage for the month of May, even though plaintiff no 
longer had an advance payment. That is why on the "Explanation of 
Account," to compute a balance of $40.12 owing, one must include an 
additional deposit which would not have been required until after 
May. Defendant's know of this accounting system and the method of 
paying and remaining one month in advance of payments due. There-
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Core, it is disingenuous to argue that it is irrelevant whether 
plaintiff had mailed the $18.00 payment. That $18.00 payment would 
tiave provided coverage through the month of May. $40.12 would have 
only been required to remain an additional month in advance on 
payments and would have provided coverage through June. 
Additionally, defendants beg the question regarding proof 
of payments. Defendants claim that, "since plaintiff is unable to 
document the payment, it would be impossible for defendant to do 
so.11 (Appellee's Brief, p. 8). Plaintiff cannot prove payment 
through documentation since defendant's had lulled plaintiff into a 
false sense of security by providing coverage over an extended 
period of time. Also, defendants have refused to produce documents 
which may.in fact either prove or lead to proof of payment. It is 
therefore illogical to claim that since plaintiff is unable to 
produce documents showing payment, it would be impossible for the 
defendant to do so. Plaintiff believes he can show through dis-
covery that under defendants computer system it would be highly 
unlikely and almost impossible for defendants to allow coverage 
unless payment was received. 
V. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD PLAINTIFF WILL 
PREVAIL ON A BAD FAITH CLAIM. 
Defendant's claim that no duty existed between plaintiff 
and defendant with regard to the policy in question. However, 
defendants skirt the concerns the Utah Supreme Court stated in Beck 
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
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Plaintiff's bad faith claim rests in part upon its 
allegation that defendants not only wrongfully denied coverage, but 
mailed a notice of cancellation long after its marked expiratior 
date. In essence, plaintiff alleges that defendants committed a 
blatant fraud upon the plaintiff by sending a notice of cancellation 
long after coverage was extended. 
Also, defendants lead plaintiff to rely to his detriment. 
Defendants admitted coverage and plaintiff retained medical help he 
could not otherwise afford. Defendant's paid for medical help for 
four months and then suddenly put stop payment on one of their 
checks which had been issued for one of plaintiff's medical provi-
ders. (R. 126). This left plaintiff with outstanding medical bills 
which were incurred on the belief that defendants would pay them. 
These bills are still unpaid and have injured plaintiff's credit 
rating. When defendants decided to cancel they should have at least 
paid the medical expenses incurred up to that time. 
Defendants not only stopped payment on a check but threat-
ened Mr. Godoy with suit if he did not return all money he had 
received from the defendants as well as all money his health care 
providers had received from defendants. (R. 128). Mr. Godoy did 
not have the money. Farmer's bad faith occurred because it knew Mr. 
Godoy had relied as anyone in his position would and knew the 
mistake, assuming arguendo it was a mistake, in covering the 
accident was Farmers, yet it tried to force Mr. Godoy to pay for the 
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tiistake by himself. Defendants did not act reasonably in denying 
:he claim as required by Beck, 
Additionally, defendant's, in an attempt to cover up their 
fraud and wrongdoing would not produce documents necessary and vital 
to plaintiff's claim that a payment was mailed and that defendants 
knowingly and wrongfully sent notice of cancellation late and have 
attempted to cover up or obscure that fact, and that defendants 
acted in bad faith by acting unreasonably in denying the claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and all the reasons set 
forth in the opening brief, appellant, Rudolfo Godoy asks the court 
to reverse its denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or 
in the alternative to reverse the court's granting of summary 
judgment against the plaintiff. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL', P.C. 
- [ILL * mL 
DentW M. Hatchl 7 
Attorney for Rudolfo Godoy 
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